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I. INTRODUCTION
On September 30, 1991, a military coup deposed President
Jean Bertrand Aristide, the first democratically elected president
of Haiti in two hundred years. In the weeks that followed, political
violence swept through the Caribbean island. Aristide's supporters
and their families were threatened, tracked down, arrested, and in
some instances, tortured and killed by the military. Thousands of
Haitians fled the political violence of their country. Small wooden
boats and other make-shift vessels carried the refugees toward an-
ticipated respite in the United States. The United States govern-
ment, however, had already cast its nets upon the waters separat-
ing the coasts of Cuba and Haiti, ensnaring thousands of Haitian
civilians. The United States Coast Guard, acting pursuant to the
interdiction program enacted by the executive order of President
Ronald Reagan in 1981, intercepted Haitians at sea and sank their
boats. The United States Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS) immediately interviewed the Haitians crowded aboard the
* J.D. cum laude, University of Miami School of Law, 1991.
** J.D. cum laude, University of Miami School of Law, 1991. Student Research and
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Coast Guard cutters. Conducting the most perfunctory of asylum
interviews, the INS determined that only a handful of the Haitians
interdicted met the criteria for political asylum. As the interdiction
program progressed, the number of Haitians aboard Coast Guard
cutters swelled to the thousands.
On November 18, 1991, President George Bush announced
that the Haitians aboard Coast Guard cutters would be repatriated
to Haiti. That same day, the United States repatriated over five
hundred Haitian refugees. The next morning, Ira Kurzban, a
Miami attorney representing the Haitian Refugee Center, Inc.
(HRC), 1 filed an action in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Florida. The HRC sought to prevent the re-
turn of Haitian refugees until the U.S. government implemented
fair screening procedures which would enable the refugees to voice
their claims for political asylum. The United States began unload-
ing Haitians from Coast Guard cutters to the United States Naval
base in Guantanamo, Cuba, where they were held in make-shift
camps behind razor wire.
While the United States government maintained custody of
the Haitians, it refused to allow the refugees access to American
counsel who sought to vindicate the Haitians' rights under United
States and international law. In HRC v. Baker, the Haitian Refu-
gee Center challenged the actions of U.S. administrative officials
(INS officers) in Washington, D.C.; HRC sought to enforce the
Haitians' right not to be returned to a country in which they
feared political persecution, torture, and even death, at least, not
without fair procedures that would enable the Haitians to properly
assert their political asylum claims. Throughout the case, the
United States government denied the Haitians access to counsel,2
1. According to the Verified Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at para. 8,
HRC v. Baker, 953 F.2d 1498 (11th Cir. 1992) (No. 91-2653-Civ.-Atkins), the Haitian Refu-
gee Center is a non-profit membership corporation whose purpose is "to promote the well-
being of Haitian refugees through appropriate programs and activities, including legal repre-
sentation of Haitian refugees, education regarding legal and civil rights, orientation, accul-
turation, and social and referral services."
2. We note here one exception. At the beginning of the litigation, District Judge Donald
Graham, presiding instead of Judge Atkins, granted HRC's discovery request for access to
the Haitians on Guantanamo and aboard the Coast Guard cutters. By meeting the limited
number of Haitians the government allowed HRC to see, HRC was able to amend its initial
complaint to include the named class members. Many of the Haitian detainees also became
members of the Haitian Refugee Center during the discovery visits, thus adding to the first




but the government did allow a host of media, religious groups,
and international spectators to visit the detained Haitians, both
aboard the Coast Guard cutters and in Guantanamo.
This paper examines the United States government's actions
which denied the Haitians access to counsel, as well as its actions
denying the Haitian Refugee Center and its attorneys access to the
detained Haitians. More specifically, this paper examines the First
Amendment issues raised in HRC v. Baker and the federal courts'
treatment of those issues in light of existing Supreme Court First
Amendment jurisprudence.
II. THE FIRST AMENDMENT CLAIM
The initial complaint alleged that the named defendants failed
to follow INS rules and procedures intended as a safeguard against
the forced return of refugees possessing valid political asylum
claims. The complaint also alleged that the defendants' actions vi-
olated the Refugee Act of 1980, the Immigration and Nationality
Act, Executive Order 12324, the INS guidelines promulgated under
Executive Order 12324, the Fifth Amendment of the United States
Constitution, and international law, including Article 33 of United
Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of the Refugees.'
The amended complaint specifically asserted that defendants'
refusal to allow counsel access to its clients violated HRC's and the
Haitians' First Amendment rights. Because the government al-
lowed press, religious groups, political representatives, and even
another attorney to visit HRC's clients, HRC argued that the ban
on HRC's access to the Haitians was content-based
discrimination.4
On December 3, 1991, Senior United States District Judge C.
Clyde Atkins determined that HRC had a First Amendment right
of access to the Haitians detained on Coast Guard cutters and on
Guantanamo Naval base. Judge Atkins additionally ruled that the
Haitians "[w]ere denied information concerning their rights, the
3. "No Contracting State shall expel or return (refouler) a refugee in any manner what-
soever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on ac-
count of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political
opinion." U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of the Refugees, July 28, 1951, art. 33, 139
U.N.T.S. 150, 176.
4. However, as noted by both District Judge Atkins and the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals majority, HRC did not amend its complaint to allege that the government was
depriving HRC of its First Amendment rights based on the content of HRC's message.
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availability of counsel, and assistance in making their asylum
claims" and that HRC had a right of access based on the First
Amendment right of counsel to "inform individuals of their rights,
at least when they do so as an exercise of political speech without
expectation of remuneration."5
At the hearing, the government urged that Ukrainian-Ameri-
can Bar Association (UABA) v. Baker' was dispositive on the issue
of counsel's First Amendment right to access. In UABA v. Baker,
the UABA obtained a court order which required the Secretary of
State and the INS to give Soviet and East Bloc aliens seeking asy-
lum in the United States a notice advising them of the UABA's
offer to provide asylum seekers with free legal advice. The govern-
ment appealed to the court of appeals, arguing that it was under
no obligation to provide would-be asylum seekers with information
about the UABA's legal assistance program. UABA'held that the
government had no affirmative obligation to provide governmental
assistance to help the UABA achieve its political objectives.
Judge Atkins, however, distinguished Ukrainian-American
Bar Association, noting that "unlike the UABA, HRC [w]as not
asserting that its [F]irst [A]mendment right imposes any affirma-
tive obligation on the defendants. Instead, HRC sought reasonable
and meaningful right of access that is consistent with the govern-
ment's time, place and manner restrictions. '
Judge Atkins carefully abstained from any judicial activism,
allowing the government to provide a plan for reasonable and
meaningful access to HRC's clients. The government, however, de-
clined to permit access and never submitted a plan. Rather, the
government asserted in its emergency motion for stay pending ap-
peal that counsel had no right of access whatsoever. Although
Judge Atkins certified the Haitian plaintiffs as a class, the govern-
ment continued to deny class counsel access to their clients, while
5. District Court Order Granting Preliminary Injunctive Relief and Supporting Memo-
randum Opinion dated December 3, 1991 [hereinafter District Court Order] at 45 (quoting
Jean v. Nelson, 727 F.2d 957, 983 (11th Cir. 1984)).
6. 893 F.2d 1374 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
7. It is essential to note that in UABA v. Baker the United States Court of Appeals for
the D.C. Circuit rejected, without any substantive analysis, Jean v. Nelson which stated
that "counsel have a first amendment right to inform [detained aliens] of their rights, at
least when they do so as an exercise of political speech without expectation of remunera-
tion." UABA, 893 F.2d at 1381 (quoting Jean v. Nelson, 727 F.2d 957, 983 (11th Cir. 1984)
(en banc)).
8. District Court Order, supra note 5, at 47.
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continuing to allow access to non-parties, such as the media, reli-
gious groups, and other spectators.9
III. THE FOUNDATION OF THE RIGHT TO ACCESS
Judge Atkins specifically determined that the basis of HRC's
right of access was the First Amendment right of counsel to "in-
form individuals of their rights, at least when they do so as an ex-
ercise of political speech without expectation of remuneration."
This fundamental right is founded in Supreme Court precedent,
such as NAACP v. Button0 and In re Primus," as well as in Jean
v. Nelson," an Eleventh Circuit decision.
In NAACP v. Button, a Virginia statute forbade the solicita-
tion of legal business by a "runner" or "capper."'" The definition
of a "runner" or "capper" included an agent for an individual or
organization which retains a lawyer in connection with an action to
which it is not a party and in which it has no pecuniary right or
liability. The Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals had held that the
actions of the NAACP, specifically the manner in which it ob-
tained plaintiffs to challenge racial policies, could be constitution-
ally proscribed by Chapter 33's expanded definitions.14  The
NAACP petitioned the United States Supreme Court for a writ of
certiorari to review the decision of the Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals.
In re Primus involved a First Amendment challenge to a stat-
utory prohibition against solicitation. South Carolina lawyer Edna
9. The government's denial of access of HRC's attorneys to the Haitian refugees, while
permitting other non-party visitors, clearly supported the argument that the government
excluded HRC attorneys based on the content of their message.
10. 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
11. 436 U.S. 412 (1978).
12. 727 F.2d 957 (11th Cir. 1984)(en banc).
13. 1956 Va. Acts ch. 33.
14. The Supreme Court described in detail how the NAACP obtained party plaintiffs.
For example, a local NAACP branch would invite a legal staff member to explain to a meet-
ing of parents and children the legal steps necessary to achieve desegregation. The staff
members would bring printed forms to the meeting authorizing them and other NAACP or
Defense Fund attorneys to represent the signers in legal proceedings to achieve desegrega-
tion. On occasion, some of those present would sign the blank forms with the understanding
that a member or members of the legal staff, with or without the assistance from other
NAACP lawyers, or from the Defense Fund, would handle the case. Sometimes, the Virginia
State Conference of NAACP branches distributed petitions to local branches for the pur-
pose of finding petitioners willing to "go all the way" in any possible litigation that might
ensue. Button, 371 U.S. at 421-422.
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Smith Primus advised a gathering of women about their legal
rights stemming from their having been sterilized as a pre-condi-
tion to receiving public medical assistance. The attorney, affiliated
with a branch of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), sent
a letter advising that free legal assistance was available from the
ACLU. As a result of these actions, the lawyer was publicly repri-
manded by the South Carolina Supreme Court.
In both NAACP v. Button and In re Primus, the petitioners
launched constitutional challenges which claimed that the statu-
tory proscriptions against solicitation encroached upon First
Amendment rights. In Button, the NAACP charged that Chapter
33, as applied to its activities, abridged the freedoms guaranteed
by the First Amendment. Specifically, petitioners claimed that the
statute infringed upon "the right of the NAACP and its members
and lawyers to associate for the purpose of assisting persons who
seek legal redress for infringement of their constitutionally guaran-
teed and other rights."1" The United States Supreme Court re-
versed the decision of the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals,
holding that the activities of the NAACP, its affiliates, and legal
staff were political activities - modes of expression and associa-
tion protected by the First Amendment.
In Primus the petitioner charged that the ACLU's letter offer-
ing legal services to the prospective litigant involved constitution-
ally protected expression and association protected under the First
Amendment. The Court considered Ms. Primus's motivation for
soliciting the litigant and distinguished Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar
Association,16 a case which the Court decided the same day.
Ohralik held that states may proscribe in-person solicitation by
lawyers seeking to communicate with potential clients when their
motivation is to communicate purely commercial offers. The Court
distinguished Ohralik by accurately noting that Primus did not en-
gage in an in-person solicitation for pecuniary gain. The Court con-
cluded that Primus had expressed personal political beliefs in the
advancement of the associational objectives of the ACLU.
After Button, Primus, and Ohralik, organizational activity
designed to inform individuals of their rights, at least when done
as an exercise of political speech without expectation of remunera-
tion, cannot be completely proscribed consistent with First
15. Id. at 428.
16. 436 U.S. 447, reh'g denied, 439 U.S. 883 (1978).
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Amendment protection. Any restriction with respect to time, place,
and manner must be reasonable and, under prevailing First
Amendment jurisprudence, may not be based on the content of the
political speech or its acceptability to the censor.
These principles and legal standards were fully applicable in
Jean v. Nelson,'" where the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
,stated: "The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that coun-
sel have a [F]irst [A]mendment right to inform individuals of their
rights, at least when they do so as an exercise of political speech
without expectation of remuneration."'" The Jean court recognized
counsel's right of access to detained aliens while considering the
government's demonstrated countervailing considerations. The
court acknowledged that the regulation of detained aliens may im-
plicate security concerns similar to those applicable in the prison
context. The court concluded that it was the district court's re-
sponsibility to fashion a remedy that strikes the proper balance
between the government's security interest and HRC's exercise of
its First Amendment rights.'9
In light of the foregoing precedent, the district court properly
held that the HRC and its attorneys had a First Amendment right
of access to counsel its clients. HRC was no less a political advo-
cacy group than the NAACP in Button or the ACLU in Primus. In
fact, the Eleventh Circuit had already recognized HRC as such in
prior cases, including Jean.20 Coupled with the fact that the dis-
trict court had already certified the Haitian detainees as a class
and HRC as their attorneys, the government's continued shielding
of the refugees seemed incredible.
NAACP v. Button and In re Primus firmly established the
First Amendment's protection of speech designed to further politi-
cal goals, particularly through litigation that challenges legislative
or executive action. The First Amendment protects petitioning for
judicial redress of grievances where access to the legislative process
is ineffective. The motivation of the speaker and the organization
whose goals were advanced by speech - not the audience receiving
17. 727 F.2d 957 (11th Cir. 1984)(en banc). In Jean, the exercise of First Amendment
rights was not conditioned on the recipient of the message having reciprocal rights.
18. Id. at 983 (citing In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415
(1963)).
19. Jean, 727 F.2d at 984.
20. See Jean, 727 F.2d 957 (11th Cir. 1984); Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc. v. Nelson, 872
F.2d 1555, 1561 n.10 (11th Cir 1990), afJ'd sub nor. McNary v. Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc.,
111 S. Ct. 888 (1991).
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the message - distinguishes Button and Primus from Ohralik. As
long as the speaker or organization engaged in political speech
"without expectation of remuneration," the exercise of the speech
is a fundamental right protected by the First Amendment. Consid-
ering both its message and its motivation, HRC and its counsel
had a protected First Amendment right to speak with their clients.
The government sought to eviscerate that right by claiming it
did not exist. Solicitor General Starr argued that the Haitians had
no First Amendment rights since they were aliens outside of
United States borders. He argued that HRC had no First Amend-
ment right of access to the Haitians on Guantanamo and aboard
Coast Guard cutters unless the recipients of HRC's message had a
corresponding First Amendment right to hear HRC's message. In-
terestingly, Starr based this argument on dicta in Ukrainian-
American Bar Association, where the court, without specifically
addressing the issue, suggested that the UABA's First Amendment
right could not be derivative of the rights of those detainees the
UABA wished to counsel.2" As authority, the UABA court relied on
other courts of appeals which had held that an unadmitted alien
has no Sixth Amendment right to counsel even in the civil depor-
tation process.22 The Eleventh Circuit panel accepted the govern-
ment's argument which asserted that the detained Haitians had no
First Amendment right, remarking, "[I]n the present case, the in-
terdicted Haitians have no recognized substantive rights under the
laws or Constitution of the United States. Thus, it would be non-
sensical to find that HRC possesses a right of access to the inter-
dicted Haitians for the purpose of advising them of their legal
rights. 2s3 The circuit court found that even assuming that HRC
had a limited right, Ukrainian-American Bar Association pre-
vented the exercise of that right. The panel majority stated that
HRC's claim was "nothing more than a claim that it has a right to
compel the government to assist it in exercising a right of associa-
tion. ' 24 By framing the issue as such and relying on Ukrainian-
American Bar Association v. Baker, non-binding precedent from
another circuit that is factually distinguishable,2 the court swept
21. UABA v. Baker, 893 F.2d 1374, 1382 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
22. See Lozada v. INS, 857 F.2d 10, 13 (1st Cir. 1988); Baires v. INS, 856 F.2d 89, 90
(9th Cir. 1988). These cases, based on the Sixth Amendment right to counsel in criminal
cases, have no relevant application here.
23. HRC v. Baker, 953 F.2d 1498, 1513 (11th Cir. 1992).
24. Id.
25. HRC was not seeking the government's assistance.
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away HRC's First Amendment rights.26
HRC's right of access should not have been dependent on the
Haitian's right to hear its message - it should only have been lim-
ited by content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions and
the government's countervailing interest in maintaining security
and order.
IV. TIME, PLACE, AND MANNER RESTRICTIONS IN THE QUASI-
MILITARY FORUM
HRC v. Baker is inconsistent with U.S. Supreme Court and
Eleventh Circuit jurisprudence which would protect HRC's First
Amendment rights within the framework of reasonable time, place,
and manner restrictions in the quasi-military forum of Guanta-
namo Naval base.
Guantanamo is a mixed use Naval base consisting of military
and non-military facilities. The Haitian detainees were housed in
non-military sections of the base, which according to General
Master Don Bierman, represented a "slice of America." The stan-
dards for evaluating the right of access vary with the character of
the property at issue.
Perry Education Association v. Perry Local Educators' Asso-
ciation,27 defined three types of public properties. The first are
purely public forums, such as streets and parks, where limits on
expressive activity are sharply circumscribed; not only must the
regulations be content-neutral, they must be narrowly tailored to
serve a significant government interest such that ample alternative
channels of communication are left open.
The second are public forums opened for the purpose of ex-
pressive activity, such as university meeting halls and municipal
theaters. Here, the same standards apply as in purely public fo-
rums - reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions are
permissible.
The third type of public property are non-traditional public
forums and are governed by different standards. The First Amend-
ment "does not guarantee access to property simply because it is
26. A natural extension of the circuit court's opinion would bar the transmission of
political messages to Cuba via radio or television, as Cubans possess no First Amendment
right to hear freedom messages.
27. 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
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owned or controlled by the government.""8 Guantanamo best fits
into this third category.
The government sought to take advantage of the Naval base's
location outside of the United States. Appealing Judge Atkins' or-
der, the government argued that "[iut is settled law that aliens
outside of the United States cannot challenge their exclusion on
the basis of any [F]irst [A]mendment interest in communications
with American citizens."2 The government also argued that "the
judiciary may not second-guess immigration determinations at the
behest of American citizens claiming a right to communicate with
aliens, so long as the Executive has a 'facially legitimate and bona
fide' reason for the exclusion."30 Thus, by denying HRC any access
to its clients, the government was able to argue that the district
court's order granting reasonable and meaningful access forced the
government to "retain the aliens within U.S. custody, either by
bringing them to this country or by keeping them aboard Coast
Guard ships or transporting them to a U.S. military installation in
foreign territory. Forcing Executive officials to follow one of these
courses, rather than repatriate those aliens found not to have a
legitimate claim of refugee status, is certainly as intrusive as the
grant of the short-term visa sought in Kleindienst."1 In other
words, the government argued that the district court's grant of ac-
cess forced it to refrain from repatriating the Haitians. The gov-
ernment opted to keep them in custody abroad or at sea so that it
could regulate with whom the Haitians spoke. In this manner, the
government was able to equate HRC's requested access with relief
circumscribed by Kleindienst - admission based on the alien's
non-existent First Amendment rights.
Thus, the government claimed that its chosen forum allowed it
to deny access to counsel while selectively allowing access to other
persons without judicial interference. The government argued:
While its asserted rights would be ambitious were the aliens in-
carcerated within the United States, see Ukrainian-American
Bar Association, 893 F.2d at 1381, here the activity in which
28. United States Postal Service v. Greenburgh Civic Ass'n, 453 U.S. 114, 129 (1981).
29. Brief for Appellants/Cross-Appellees at 25, HRC v. Baker, 953 F.2d 1498 (11th Cir.
1992) (Nos. 91-6099, 91-6105, 91-6118) [hereinafter Brief for Appellants] (citing Kleindienst
v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762 (1972); United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 271
(1990)).
30. Brief for Appellants, supra note 29, at 25-26 (citing Kleindienst, 408 U.S. at 769-
70).
31. Brief for Appellants, supra note 29, at 28.
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[HRC] asserts a right of access involves U.S. vessels on the high
seas and a military facility leased from another sovereign nation.
Establishment of such a right might compel the government to
provide any variety of interested citizens with access to aliens
seeking sanctuary in U.S. embassies and facilities abroad. Here,
as in Kleindienst, approval of [HRC's] [F]irst [A]mendment
claim would "prove too much," either making a nullity of the
Executive's broad discretion in matters of foreign policy, mili-
tary operations, and immigration enforcement, or thrusting
upon the courts a case by case balancing of political interests for
which they are plainly ill-suited. 408 U.S. at 768-69; see Ukrain-
ian-American Bar Association, 893 F.2d at 1379-80.2
In oral argument (second appeal in the Eleventh Circuit)
Judge Cox asked Solicitor General Starr whether the record con-
tained any reason why HRC could not have access to its clients on
Guantanamo. Judge Cox specifically wanted to know whether a
commanding officer at the naval base had said that it was neces-
sary to limit HRC's access to the Haitians at Guantanamo for mili-
tary reasons. Judge Cox even went so far as to proclaim at oral
argument: "If some commanding officer tells me 'That's my posi-
tion,' then that's okay. I, as a judge am not going to look at it."
Solicitor General Starr could provide no such military rationale.
The record contained no military justification for denying HRC ac-
cess to its clients on Guantanamo, but after oral argument the gov-
ernment did submit to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affi-
davits which were untested by any adversarial process. Though the
court of appeals accepted this post hoc military justification, it was
not part of the factual record nor did it comport with the Supreme
Court's analysis in Greer v. Spock 33 which provides a test for the
application of military rationale to First Amendment restrictions
in a military forum.
Greer v. Spock upheld the right of military authorities to limit
access to military installations where the access is found to consti-
tute a "clear danger to [military] loyalty, discipline, or morale." '34
However, the United States Supreme Court in Greer specifically
32. Emergency Motion for Stay Pending Appeal dated December 4, 1991 at 23. Com-
pare THE FEDERALIST No. 78 ("[L]iberty can have nothing to fear from the judiciary alone,
but would have everything to fear from its union with either of the other departments [exec-
utive and legislative]; that as all the effects of such a union must ensue from a dependence
of the former on the latter, notwithstanding a nominal and apparent separation ....
33. 424 U.S. 828 (1976).
34. Id. at 840.
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stated that the government could not, consistent with the First
Amendment, deny access to a military forum simply because the
government does not agree with the content of the First Amend-
ment expression involved. While the Supreme Court upheld the
limitations on access to a military installation in Greer, the Court
noted that the record demonstrated a "policy, objectively and
even-handedly applied, of keeping official military activities there
wholly free of entanglement with partisan political campaigns of
any kind .... ,,35 Thus, while Greer provided no general right of
access to a military installation, the Supreme Court carefully cir-
cumscribed the government's power. The public's First Amend-
ment right of access to military installations can only be limited in
situations where the restriction on First Amendment activities are
objectively and even-handedly applied and where the government
does not discriminate on the basis of content.
Nation Magazine v. U.S. Dept. of Defense38 is a case with is-
sues similar to those in HRC v. Baker. In Nation, members of the
press asserted First and Fifth Amendment challenges to regula-
tions promulgated by the United States Department of Defense
denying them access to the American military operations of Desert
Shield and Desert Storm. The plaintiffs claimed "that the press
has a [F]irst [A]mendment right of unlimited access to a foreign
arena in which American military forces are engaged. ' 37 Similarly
in Baker, HRC sought access to its clients who, though on a mili-
tary base, were actually located in areas of the base not used for
military operations. Even more importantly, HRC sought access to
members of a class of plaintiffs who already were represented by
HRC in pending litigation.
The district court in Nation noted:
[T]he government chose to grant some access to the press for
purposes of covering military activities in the Persian Gulf. By
opening the door, albeit in a limited manner, the government
created a place for expressive activity. Establishing pools for
coverage of the "initial stages" of the Persian Gulf conflict, the
government, in essence, determined that the war theater was a
limited public forum .... Regardless of whether the govern-
ment is constitutionally required to open the battlefield to the
press as representatives of the public, a question that [the dis-
35. Id. at 839.
36. 762 F. Supp. 1558 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
37. Id. at 1566.
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trict court] declined to decide, once the government does so it is
bound to do so in a non-discriminatory manner.38
Thus, Greer and Nation Magazine offer important First Amend-
ment analyses which were never thoroughly explored in HRC v.
Baker either by the Eleventh Circuit or by the United States Su-
preme Court which denied certiorari. In HRC v. Baker the govern-
ment extended its civilian administrative activities, reaching out
into international waters, and interjecting American administrative
processes into the lives of Haitians at sea, who, once their boats
were destroyed and they were forcibly detained by the United
States, were completely at the mercy of the United States govern-
ment. By keeping the Haitians on navy ships and on the military
base in Guantanamo, the United States government was able to
prevent the plaintiffs' attorneys from counseling the Haitians. As
previously noted, this denial of access was not content-neutral.3 9
Nation Magazine and Greer suggest that even if there had been a
military reason for denying access, remand would still be necessary
to determine whether the denial of access was applied in a content-
neutral manner. Here the error was compounded by the problem
that the government had failed to establish in the record any mili-
tary reason for denying access.
Once the government opened Guantanamo to members of the
press, the clergy, the U.N High Commission, and other attorneys,
the government could not close Guantanamo to HRC's attorneys
- such selective denial constitutes discrimination against view-
points that the government finds offensive or disagreeable. The
rigid proscription of Greer v. Spock4" was not applicable. The gov-
ernment abandoned its right to deny access upon opening the gates
of Guantanamo and granting access to the Haitian detainees, for
38. 762 F. Supp. at 1573 (citing Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 16 (1978); Ameri-
can Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. Cuomo, 570 F.2d 1080, 1083 (2d Cir. 1977)).
39. The Eleventh Circuit panel majority emphasized that the district court found "that
there was no allegation that the government's denial of access to the interdicted Haitians
was the product of viewpoint discrimination." 953 F.2d at 1512 n.7. Counsel for HRC con-
tinually argued viewpoint discrimination in its briefs, and the reliance on the absence of a
third amended complaint, enabled the Court to ignore the reality of counsel's argument -
that the government's exercise of discretion, and accompanying censorship of HRC's views,
was based on the content of HRC's message.
40. 424 U.S. 828 (1976). In Greer, Fort Dix Military Base was devoted to military train-
ing, and regulations limiting political speech were strictly and consistently enforced. Greer
recognized that the government could proscribe First Amendment rights in this type of mili-
tary forum as long as the denial was not arbitrary.
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other press, religious, and political purposes.4 1
V. THE FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHT AND AFFIRMATIVE GOVERNMENT
ASSISTANCE
In Nation Magazine the plaintiffs claimed that "no affirmative
assistance from the Government is being requested, only the free-
dom from interference .... 42 Chief Judge Tjoflat and Judge Cox
agreed that HRC did not have a First Amendment right of access
to interdicted Haitians on Guantanamo, and that even if HRC did
have a right to associate with the Haitians, "this right of associa-
tion would not give rise to the right of access which HRC claims. '4 3
Judges Tjoflat and Cox went on to say that "[iun reality, HRC's
claim is that it has a right to associate with the interdicted Hai-
tians and it has a right to compel the government to assist it in
asserting that right. The Constitution, however, does not require
the government to assist the holder of a constitutional right in the
exercise of that right."4 4 The Eleventh Circuit majority opinion
thus flies in the face of Judge Atkins' factual findings in the dis-
trict court and the narrowly drawn relief which Judge Atkins left
to the government to fashion. Judge Atkins had not ordered the
government to provide any particular assistance to HRC, but did
require the government to devise a plan to allow HRC meaningful
access to the Haitians. In this aspect HRC v. Baker was factually
distinguishable from Ukrainian-American Bar Association. Judge
-Atkins noted that in Ukrainian-American Bar Association, the at-
torneys were seeking affirmative assistance from the government:
notifying a private political group and distributing literature about
a private political organization to persons who might in the future
flee the Soviet Union. HRC did not seek any affirmative assistance;
HRC simply sought the same treatment as the non-parties who
41. Thus, under Perry's analysis of even a non-traditional public forum, the govern-
ment's limitation on access violated HRC's First Amendment rights. Additionally, findings
of fact were made in the district court regarding Guantanamo's use and character. It was
improper for the court of appeals to ignore those findings and others regarding the extent
that the base had been opened to the press and non-parties. It was improper for the court of
appeals to ignore those findings regarding the character of the base as found by the general
master. It was also improper to permit the introduction of new findings, based on unchal-
lenged affidavits at the appellate level, contrary to the carefully detailed findings in the trial
court.
42. 762 F.2d at 1571.
43. 953 F.2d at 1513.
44. Id. (citations omitted).
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were allowed into Guantanamo.
HRC's First Amendment right to counsel the detained Hai-
tians should not have been dependent on the Haitians' right to
hear HRC's message. Because the district court did not find that
HRC was seeking the government's affirmative assistance in coun-
seling the Haitian detainees, the Eleventh Circuit's opinion in
HRC v. Baker is unsettling.
VI. THE CHECKING VALUE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a re-
dress of grievances."
The Constitution provides for freedom of expression and free-
dom of association "without regard to the race, creed, or political
or religious affiliation of the members of the group which invokes
its shield, or to the truth, popularity, or social utility of the ideas
and beliefs which are offered. '46 As Justice Brennan so eloquently
stated in Perry Education Association, "Viewpoint discrimination
is censorship in its purest form and government regulation that
discriminates among viewpoints threatens the continued vitality of
'free speech'."
'' 7
As noted by Professor Winick in his essay dedicated to Ira
Kurzban, the First Amendment has played an invaluable role in
complementing this checking value of the independent bar in as-
serting human rights in the face of government abuses. The First
Amendment should serve to expose shameful government action
and bring public pressure to right and cleanse government prac-
tices. As Justice Brandeis once aptly noted, "Sunlight is said to be
the best of disinfectants."'44 And, as Justice Harlan stated in
N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama, "Effective advocacy of both public and
private points of view, particularly controversial ones, is undenia-
bly enhanced by group association . . . . -4HRC v. Baker exposed
45. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
46. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 444-45 (1963).
47. 460 U.S. 37, 61 (1983) (J. Brennan dissenting).
48. Louis D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 92
(1914).
49. 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958).
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the United States government's questionable motive in arbitrarily
excluding from asylum groups of black Haitians who demonstrate
credible fears of political persecution under Article 33 of the U.N.
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees. By placing content-
based restrictions on access to forums in which the United States
government has interjected its activity, the executive sought to
censure and control political controversy over its policies. It took a
handful of determined lawyers and the independence of one care-
ful and experienced federal district judge to shed light on the Hai-
tian plight at the hands of the United States government.
But as much as HRC v. Baker champions the American ideals
that protect First Amendment freedoms, the checking value of pri-
vate attorneys, and the vital role of an independent judiciary, it
also raises grave concerns about the future of First Amendment
right of access in government controlled forums, particularly mili-
tary forums.
"The people have certain natural rights which are retained by
them when they enter into Society. Such are the rights of Con-
science in matters of religion; of acquiring property and of pursu-
ing happiness & Safety; of Speaking, writing and publishing their
Sentiments with decency and freedom; of peaceably assembling to
consult their common good, and of applying to Government by pe-
tition or remonstrance for redress of grievances. Of these rights
therefore they Shall not be deprived by the Government of the
United States."5 The rights of expression embodied in the text of
the First Amendment are not a grant of rights which persons re-
ceive from the government by virtue of a contractual relationship
inherent in the citizen-state relationship. They are, rather, the lib-
erty rights of all persons regardless of their citizenship, and these
rights remain inviolate from government intrusion. Thomas Jeffer-
son said that "[a] bill of rights is what the people are entitled to
against every government on earth." The idea that the government
can suppress the right of organizations to counsel persons detained
by the United States; that Haitians have no right of access to
counsel, indeed no rights of free association, due process, liberty,
property, or freedom from political persecution because the U.S.
has pirated them off to a military installation, is inhumane and a
flagrant perversion of our Founders' vision of the Bill of Rights.
50. Roger Sherman's Draft of the Bill of Rights, reprinted in Randy Barnett, Foreword:
Unenumerated Constitutional Rights and the Rule of Law, 14 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y, 615,
629-30 (1991).
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Even more dangerous is the idea that in the context of an interna-
tional human rights crisis, the United States may work unilaterally
in foreign territories as "rescuer" and "captor" without providing
any avenues of redress in its legal system for persons whose lives
are ensnared and imperiled by its programs.
